We study optimal bidder collusion at …rst-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal from an incentiveless center about the opponent's valuation. We derive the unique symmetric equilibrium of the …rst price auction for any symmetric, possibly correlated, distribution of signals, when these can only take two values. Next, we …nd the distribution of 2-valued signals, which maximizes the joint payo¤s of bidders. We prove that allowing signals to take more than two values will not increase bidders'payo¤s if the signals are restricted to be public. We also investigate the case when the signals are chosen conditionally independently and identically out of n 2 possible values. We demonstrate that bidders are strictly better o¤ as signals can take on more and more possible values. Finally, we look at another special case of the correlated signals, namely, when these are independent of the bidders' valuations. We show that in any symmetric 2-valued strategy correlated equilibrium, the bidders bid as if there were no signals at all and, hence, are not able to collude.
Introduction
In a standard independent private value (IPV) …rst price auction it is assumed that each bidder observes her own valuation but has no information about her opponents'valuations except for the distribution from which they are drawn. However, in real life auctions, bidders may hold or may have incentives to gather additional information about their opponents'valuations. For example, in procurement auctions while a …rm's actual cost is private information, other …rms may observe its investment in new technologies which serves as a noisy signal about the …rm's actual cost. Fang and Morris (2006) , Bergemann and Vällimäki (2006) and Kim and Che (2004) are examples of setups where bidders can bene…t from such noisy signals and the seller expects less revenue in …rst price auctions compared to second price auctions. 1 Bidders can improve their position against the seller by acquiring information about each other's private information through various institutions as well. It has been recognized that trade associations, through gathering and sharing …ltered (aggregated) industry speci…c information, can serve as collusion facilitating devices. 2 For example, Genesove and Mullin (1997) provide an interesting case study of the workings of the Sugar Institute, the trade association uniting the U.S. domestic sugar re…ners from 1928 to 1936. They describe how the Sugar Institute collected, aggregated and disseminated the data about the industry among its members. One of their …ndings is that "the Sugar Institute revealed less information to its members than it knew" (Genesove and Mullin, 1997, p. 20) . Indeed, theory also suggests that bidders are better o¤ if the signals observed about the opponents'valuations contain some noise instead of being perfect signals in which case bidders would bid in a complete information environment. Hence, for collusive purposes, bidders may agree and commit to mechanisms which provide them with such noisy information about each other's valuations.
Our goal is to examine the extent to which bidders can improve their payo¤s in a one-shot IPV …rst price auction when they have access to such mechanisms. In particular, we assume that the bidders have access to a center, an incentiveless third party, which facilitates collusion between them. For the collusion to be successful, the center must be able to learn the private valuations of bidders and then, conditional on this information, coordinate the bids that the bidders submit in the auction. In this paper, we abstract away from the process how the center collects information about bidders' valuations. 3 Instead, we assume that the center already knows the realized valuation pro…le. Before bidding in the auction, the center, depending on the realized valuation pro…le, sends random (noisy) private signals to the bidders about each other's valuations. Of course, as in a standard IPV setup, each bidder also knows her own valuation. We emphasize that a signal does not alter bidder's valuation of the object, but it changes the bidder's beliefs about the opponent's valuation. Since the signals can be correlated, a signal can also convey information about the signal received by the opponent. After learning their valuations and the signals sent by the center, bidders are allowed to bid as they want. However, by altering bidders' beliefs about the opponents' valuations, the center a¤ects equilibrium strategies of bidders in the …rst price auction. Therefore, we are interested in the following question: what is the signal structure that the center should use to maximize bidders'payo¤s? 4 As in Fang and Morris (2006) , we consider the simplest IPV setup with only two bidders, whose valuations can either take low or high value. Fang and Morris (2006) show that the seller expects less revenue in the …rst price auction than in the second price auction when signals are drawn independently (that is, a signal only depends on the valuation of the opponent), the signal received by a bidder is her private information, and the signals can take one of two values. We generalize the signal structure in several directions and address the following questions. Can the center increase bidders' payo¤s by using correlated signals? Should the signals be distributed publicly or privately? Are the bidders better o¤ if the center uses richer language instead of 2-valued signals? 3 In Section 6.1, we provide an example, which shows how the center can elicit this information from the bidders in a (weakly) incentive compatible manner. We assume that if a bidder reports some valuation to the center then she is not allowed to bid above it in the auction. Requiring full incentive compatibility leads to the analysis of communication equilibria of the …rst price auction; see, for example, Pavlov (2009) for partial results. 4 Di¤erent correlated equilibrium concepts when applied to games with incomplete information are extensively studied in Forges (1993 Forges ( , 2006 and Bergemann and Morris (2011) . According to the equilibrium classi…cation of Forges (1993 Forges ( , 2006 , we look for the best (from the bidders point of view) Bayesian solution of a standard IPV …rst-price auction, where bidders can make use of an omniscient mediator. According to Bergemann and Morris (2011) , we look for the best Bayes correlated equilibrium of the standard IPV …rst-price auction. The two concepts coincide in the current setup; see the discussion in Section 4.1 of Bergemann and Morris (2011). We analyze and compare four classes of signal structures. First, we keep the 2-valued signals as in Fang and Morris (2006) , but allow them to be correlated. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium for any 2valued symmetric signal structure and then …nd the signal structure that maximizes the bidders' joint payo¤. Under the optimal symmetric signal structure, the signals received by the bidders are neither independent, nor perfectly correlated. Roughly speaking, a high valuation bidder, depending on the signal she receives, either learns her opponent's valuation or the signal that the opponent has received, but not both. Therefore, it is possible that both bidders have high valuation, and both know that the opponent has high valuation, but still each is unsure what the opponent knows. As a result, the bidders bid less aggressively.
An important subclass of the 2-valued symmetric signal structures contains those, in which the randomness does not depend on the bidders' realized valuation pro…le. In order to produce such signals, the center does not have to know the pro…le of bidders' valuations. Hence, the question: can the center induce collusive bidding without knowing the bidders' valuations, and just distribute correlated signals? We …nd that the answer is negative. To be more precise, the equilibrium when the bidders receive valuation-independent correlated signals and peg their bidding strategies to them, is known as a strategy-correlated equilibrium of the underlying …rst price auction. 5 We …nd the following as a by-product of the analysis of the optimal 2-valued (valuation-dependent) symmetric signal structures. No collusive equilibrium in symmetric correlated strategies exists if the center uses only 2-valued valuation-independent correlated signals. More precisely, in any symmetric strategy-correlated equilibrium, the bidders bid exactly as in the non-cooperative equilibrium, independently of the signals received. This result suggests that for the collusion to be pro…table, the center must possess some information about the valuations.
We were unable to extend the general correlated signal structure to the case when the signals are allowed to take more than two values. 6 Instead, we next consider two extreme cases when the signals are either independent or perfectly correlated, and in each case we allow the signals to take more than two values. When the signals are perfectly correlated, the center, depending on the valuation pro…le of the bidders, e¤ectively chooses a single signal out of n possible values and announces it publicly. We establish that within the class of public signals, the bidders can achieve their best payo¤s with a 2valued signal and allowing richer n valued public signal does not improve bidders' payo¤s. Even more, we show that there is no gain in having an asymmetric public signal structure since the optimum can be implemented with a symmetric one. This implies that, in terms of payo¤s, any public signal structure is dominated by the optimal 2-valued correlated signal structure discussed previously. However, the optimal public signal structure has an attractive property that, unlike the case of the optimal 2-valued correlated signal structure, it is independent of the prior beliefs of bidders. Therefore, the center might prefer to use the optimal public signal if he is unsure what are the prior beliefs of bidders. In Section 6.2, we also provide an example of sequential auction, in which a public signal structure arises at the start of the second round as the seller publicly announces the winning bid of the …rst round. This example demonstrates how the seller might (unwillingly) enhance collusion between the bidders.
The structure of the optimal 2-valued public signal is as follows. When the signal takes one of the two values, bidder 1 knows that bidder 2 has high valuation, while bidder 2 is unsure whether bidder 1 has low or high valuation. When the signal takes the other value, the roles of the bidders are reversed. Thus, after observing the signal, the bidders are asymmetric. Let us call a bidder weak if she learns that the opponent has high valuation, and otherwise call her strong. To gain intuition for the optimal public signal structure, let us …rst consider what would be the expected payo¤ of high valuation bidder in the second price auction where bidding one's valuation is a dominant strategy. If the bidder was weak, she would expect zero payo¤, that is, less than in the absence of signal. And opposite, if the bidder was strong, she would expect more than in the absence of signal. In the …rst price auction, on the contrary, both weak and strong bidder (with high valuation) expect as much as the strong bidder would expect in the second price auction, that is, both types expect more than in the absence of signal. This suggests that the public signal is optimal when the asymmetry between weak and strong types is maximal.
The result that a 2-valued public signal maximizes bidders'payo¤s within the class of public signals is in sharp contrast with our …ndings for the class of signal structures where the signals are drawn independently and identically. We show that for any n valued independent signal structure we can always construct an (n + 1) valued independent signal structure that results in strictly higher payo¤s for the bidders. Compared to the bidders'payo¤s under the optimal public signal structure, we …nd that the optimal 2-valued independent signal structure gives higher payo¤s only when the prior probability of a bidder having low valuation is low. Otherwise, the optimal public signal structure leads to higher payo¤s. Numerical results suggest that the same conclusions also hold for n > 2. Additionally, the numerical results indicate that the bidders'payo¤s under the optimal 2-valued correlated signal structure always exceed those that result from any independent signal structure for any n and any prior beliefs.
We should emphasize that, except for the public signal case, we have restricted attention to symmetric signal structures. Apart from tractability issues that arise when dealing with asymmetric signal structures, this decision was motivated by a result in Fang and Morris (2006) . They show in their Proposition 5 that even in 2-valued independent signal case, neither symmetric nor asymmetric equilibrium exists for generic values of parameters once we consider asymmetric signal structures. For all symmetric signal structures that we study we …nd a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, therefore the existence of equilibrium is not an issue in our model. However, we do not show whether or not there also exist asymmetric equilibria.
In a seminal paper, McAfee and McMillan (1992) characterize the optimal collusive mechanisms when the center needs to elicit bidders'private valuations. However, they assume the center can enforce the bids. Marshall and Marx (2007) and Lopomo, Marx, and Sun (2011) extend the model of McAfee and McMillan (1992) by assuming the center cannot control the bids that the bidders submit at the auction but he can enforce side-payments between the bidders. In particular, Lopomo, Marx, and Sun (2011) show that in this case there is no collusive mechanism that improves bidders'payo¤s relative to non-cooperative bidding even if the side-payments, which only depend on the reported valuations, are allowed. Despite this negative result, we believe it is interesting to study how the center should share his knowledge about bidders'valuations if he possessed such information and he could not control the bids directly or indirectly through monetary transfers.
There exists extensive literature that studies a similar question but from the seller's perspective. Namely, how should the seller disclose information about bidders'valuations in order to maximize his revenue. This question has 6 been addressed both when the auction rules are …xed and in the mechanism design context. Among the former, closest to our setup is the one by Kaplan and Zamir (2000) who also consider the …rst-price private value auction. They …nd that the seller can increase his revenue through public announcements about bidders'valuations. We show that the opposite result holds in our model (see Remark 2). These di¤erences can be reconciled with the help of Maskin and Riley (2000a) who compare seller's revenues in …rst-price and second-price auctions in the presence of asymmetries: the setup in Kaplan and Zamir (2000) is closer to the one considered in Proposition 4.3 (and Example 1) of Maskin and Riley (2000a) , while our setup is closer to the one in Proposition 4.5 (and Example 3). In the context of mechanism design, when the seller additionally decides on the auction format, Skreta (2011) considers a model, in which similar to our model, bidder's type is multidimensional consisting of valuation and belief components. Skreta (2011) …nds that in the IPV setup, the maximal revenue is obtained with full information disclosure but the optimal mechanism is di¤erent from the …rst-price auction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. Next, we study the four classes of signal structures in the same order as discussed above. The general 2-valued signal structures, including the correlated signals that do not depend on the bidders'valuations, are studied in Section 3, the public signal structures in Section 4, and the independent signal structures in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide two examples that illustrate how bidders can collude even if they have no access to an omniscient center. We conclude in Section 7. All major proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
Two bidders, 1 and 2, compete for an object. When we refer to a generic bidder, we use she and we do not index the notation if it does not cause confusion. Bidders'valuations of the object are independently drawn from identical distributions. We assume that bidder's valuation of the object takes one of two possible values fV L ; V H g, where we set V L = 0 and V H = 1. 7 The ex ante probability that a bidder's valuation v takes value V L is denoted by p 2 (0; 1). Of course, the probability of V H is 1 p. 7 All results extend in the obvious way for any 0 V L < V H .
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As in standard private value auction models, each bidder privately observes her own valuation v. Fang and Morris (2006) assume that each bidder also privately observes a noisy signal s about her opponent's valuation. For tractability, they assume that the noisy signal can only take two possible qualitative categories, s 2 fL; Hg. 8 Further, in Fang and Morris (2006) , the signals are drawn, conditional on realized valuations, independently and identically from a given distribution function, implying that bidder's signal conveys no information about the signal received by the opponent. We generalize their setup by allowing the signals to be correlated and/or to take on values from a larger set, namely, from the set N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
In contrast to Fang and Morris (2006) , we also assume that the bidders have access to an incentiveless center who knows the realized valuations of bidders and, depending on these, sends to the bidders private signals. We assume that prior to the auction, the bidders can choose and instruct the center, which distribution function to use for each realized pro…le of valuations. The goal is to identify the distribution that maximizes the joint payo¤ of bidders.
Since the bidders observe their signals privately, bidder l's type is a 2tuple (v l ; s l ) where s l 2 N denotes bidder l's (l = 1; 2) signal about bidder m's (m = 1; 2, m 6 = l) type (v m ; s m ). The signals are generated as follows. For all (i; j) 2 N N , Pr ((s 1 ; s 2 ) = (i; j) j (v 1 ; v 2 ) = (V L ; V L )) = r 0:ij ; Pr ((s 1 ; s 2 ) = (i; j) j (v 1 ; v 2 ) = (V H ; V L )) = r 1:ij ; Pr ((s 1 ; s 2 ) = (i; j) j (v 1 ; v 2 ) = (V L ; V H )) = r 2:ij ; Pr ((s 1 ; s 2 ) = (i; j) j (v 1 ; v 2 ) = (V H ; V H )) = r ij :
We refer to (r 0:ij ; r 1:ij ; r 2:ij ; r ij ) i2N;j2N as a signal structure. Of course,
r 0:ij 1, 0 r 1:ij 1, 0 r 2:ij 1, and 0 r ij 1 for all (i; j) 2 N N . The joint distribution of types is summarized in the following table.
(0; 1) (0; n) (1; 1) (1; n) (0; 1) p 2 r 0:11 p 2 r 0:1n p (1 p) r 2:11
Remark 1 When signals are generated independently of realized valuation pro…le, r 0:ij = r 1:ij = r 2:ij = r ij for all (i; j) 2 N N . We will refer to such signal structures as correlating devices. The Bayesian Nash equilibria corresponding to a correlating device are known as strategy-correlated equilibria (Cotter, 1991; Forges, 1993) .
The bidders participate in a …rst price auction with zero reserve price, 9 where bidders simultaneously submit bids b depending on the realizations of v and s. The highest bidder gets the object and pays her bid to the seller. In the event of a tie, the bidder with higher valuation gets the object 10 and the tie-breaking can be arbitrary if bidders'valuations are the same. Next we present an immediate result about the equilibrium behavior of types with valuation V L .
Lemma 1 In any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the …rst price auction, types (0; i) for all i 2 N bid 0.
The proof is analogous to that in Lemma A.1 of Fang and Morris (2006) and therefore is omitted. 11 Given the result of Lemma 1, in the continuation, we will only need to consider the strategies of high valuation types. Further, since in equilibrium types (0; i) bid 0, we suppress i and refer to them collectively as type v = 0, and we refer to type (1; i) for each i 2 N as type s = i. Consequently, the joint distribution of types becomes: 9 The assumption of zero reserve price is made purely for simplicity, and all subsequent results extend in the natural way if a binding reserve price is introduced. 10 On the use of this tie-breaking rule see Maskin and Riley (2000b) , Kim and Che (2004) , and Fang and Morris (2006) . One way to justify it is to assume that in case of a tie, an auxiliary second price auction is held and the highest bid from the …rst price auction serves as the starting price. 11 The proof on page 151 in Maskin and Riley (1985) can also be modi…ed and adopted to prove Lemma 1.
r 1:ij and x 2:i = n X j=1 r 2:ji for all i 2 N . It follows that, without loss of generality, we could have assumed that only high valuation bidders receive a signal from the center in the model.
Remark 2 If instead of maximizing the joint payo¤ of bidders, we were interested in maximizing seller's revenue, then in the optimum, the center must send either completely uninformative signals or, on the contrary, reveal fully the information about bidders' valuations. In both cases, the ex ante payo¤ of a bidder is p (1 p). To see that the seller cannot extract more surplus from the bidders, note that a bidder can always guarantee an ex ante payo¤ of p (1 p) by bidding 0, according to Lemma 1.
The Optimal 2-Valued Signal Structure
We start by considering 2-valued symmetric signal structures: n = 2, x 1:i = x 2:i for i = 1; 2, which we now write as x i , and r 12 = r 21 . We also assume that r 12 > 0. If r 12 = 0, then given the equilibrium behavior of type 0 in Lemma 1, the equilibrium strategies of types 1 and 2 can be determined independently. In this case, the derivation of equilibrium follows Maskin and Riley (1985) , and one can verify that the ex ante payo¤ of bidder is p (1 p), that is, the same as in the absence of collusive communication. Similarly, we rule out the case when
This case is equivalent to a single uninformative signal, which would again result in the payo¤ of p (1 p) for each bidder.
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Case 1:
Figure 1: Cases in Proposition 1
In order to …nd the optimal symmetric signal structure, we …rst characterize the equilibrium strategies. In particular, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 1 For each 2-valued symmetric signal structure, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the …rst price auction.
The full version of proposition, containing the equilibrium strategies, is stated in the Appendix. Here we highlight the main properties of the equilibrium.
Let Pr (jji) denote the conditional probability that a bidder of type i, i = 1; 2, assigns to the opponent being of type j, j = 0; 1; 2. Since we can always rename the signals, without loss of generality, we assume that Pr (0j1) Pr (0j2) holds. Obviously, the equilibrium strategies depend on the signal structure and, consequently, on the conditional probabilities. In particular, when deriving the symmetric equilibrium in Proposition 1, we distinguish four cases which are summarized in Figure 1 . 12 These cases are mutually exclusive and cover all possibilities.
In the proof to Proposition 1, we show that high valuation types use mixed strategies in the equilibrium, and the supports of these strategies are intervals. Let b i and b i denote the lower and upper endpoints of the interval for the mixed strategy of type i, i = 1; 2. We show that types 1 and 2 bid on adjacent intervals in Cases 1 and 3:
In Case 2, the support of type 1 is a subset of the support of type 2 and both supports have a common lower endpoint:
In Case 4, the support of type 2 is a subset of the support of type 1 and both supports have a common upper endpoint:
Before we identify the optimal 2-valued signal structure, we …rst discuss a special case when the signal distribution is constant over the realized valuation pro…le. That is, we want to know if there exists a symmetric strategycorrelated equilibrium that improves on the non-cooperative payo¤s. When the center uses a correlating device, the probabilities must satisfy the following additional restrictions: x 1 = r 11 +r 12 and x 2 = r 12 +r 22 . They imply that Pr (0j1) = Pr (0j2) = p. Figure 1 then tells us that any strategy-correlated equilibrium falls under Case 2 or 4. One can verify from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium strategies of high valuation types corresponding to these cases reduce to
, which are the equilibrium strategies of the standard …rst price auction (Maskin and Riley, 1985) .
Corollary 1 For any two-valued symmetric correlating device there exists a unique symmetric strategy-correlated equilibrium, which coincides with the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the …rst price auction in the absence of any signals.
This result motivates us in continuation to study signal structures that depend on bidders'valuations.
Given the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1, we are in a position to …nd the symmetric signal structure that maximizes bidders'joint payo¤.
Theorem 1 Among symmetric 2-valued signal structures, (x 1 ; x 2 ; r 11 ; r 12 ; r 22 ) = 1; 0; 0;
maximizes bidders' joint payo¤s. In the optimum, bidder's ex ante payo¤ is (1 p) p p.
The distribution of types corresponding to the optimal signal structure is shown in the following table.
The optimal signal structure falls under Case 3 in Proposition 1, where the support of type 1's strategy has collapsed in a single point.
Corollary 2 Given the optimal symmetric 2-valued signal structure, type 1 bids 0 with probability 1, while type 2 randomizes according to
One can easily verify that type 1 is indeed indi¤erent between bidding 0 and anything in 0; 1 p p . Further, in the optimum, both types expect the same payo¤ of p p. Hence, the e¤ect of collusive signals is almost the same as increasing the prior of the opponent having low valuation from p to p p.
Under the optimal signal structure, type 1 learns the signal that the opponent observes but is unsure about the opponent's valuation. On the other hand, type 2 learns that the opponent has high valuation but is unsure about the signal that the opponent observes. Consequently, type 1 knows that if the opponent has high valuation, she will bid relatively aggressively. Therefore, type 1 …nds it optimal only to compete against the low valuation opponent. Although type 2 knows that she faces the high valuation bidder and therefore needs to bid relatively aggressively, her bid is suppressed by the possibility that the opponent bids very low.
Clearly, the payo¤ found in Theorem 1 is strictly higher than the payo¤ of p (1 p) that a bidder would expect in the absence of collusive signals. For example, when p = 0:25, the former payo¤ is double the latter one. If the bidders were able to capture the entire surplus, then the ex ante payo¤ of bidder would be (1 p) p + 1 2 (1 p) . Hence, there still exists a scope for improvement upon the optimal 2-valued signal payo¤s, but we have not been able to prove if allowing signals to take more values will strictly increase the bidders'payo¤s. However, as the next section demonstrates, when the signals are restricted to be public or, equivalently, perfectly correlated, adding more values does not improve on the optimal 2-valued public signals.
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We now consider a situation when the signals are public. We allow signals to take an arbitrary number of values, n 2, and the signal structure to be asymmetric. Consider the second table in Section 2. When the signals are public, in each row i, the probabilities r ij are strictly positive for at most one j, and in each column j, the probabilities r ij are strictly positive for at most one i. Since we can reorder and rename rows and columns, we assume that r ij 0 if i = j and r ij = 0 otherwise. Given this assumption, we say that both bidders observe one common signal, instead of a pair of signals. 13 Proposition 2 Given a public signal i 2 N , if r ii = 0, then both bidders submit bids equal to 0. If x 1:i = x 2:i = 0 and r ii > 0, then both bidders submit bids equal to 1. If x l:i
x m:i , x l:i > 0, and r ii > 0, then the equilibrium of the …rst price auction is as follows:
1. Bidder l with v l = 1 randomizes according to
on the interval 0; b i , and puts a mass F l:i (0) > 0 on bid 0 if x l:i > x m:i ;
2. Bidder m with v m = 1 randomizes according to
The equilibrium payo¤ of a bidder with valuation v = 1 is
Given the equilibrium strategies, we now provide a signal structure that maximizes bidders'joint payo¤. In particular, we prove that there exists a 2-valued public signal structure that achieves the maximal payo¤. In the proof to the following theorem, we show that we can increase the joint payo¤ if we aggregate all signals for which x 1:i x 2:i into one single signal and all the remaining signals into the second signal.
Theorem 2 To achieve the maximal joint payo¤ with public signals, it is enough that the signal takes two values, n = 2. The optimal 2-valued public signal structure is (x 1:1 ; x 1:2 ; x 2:1 ; x 2:2 ; r 11 ; r 22 ) = (1; 0; 0; 1; 0:5; 0:5). In the optimum, each bidder's ex ante payo¤ is p (1 p) 2 1+p .
The distribution of types corresponding to the optimal public signal structure is summarized in the following table:
The optimum can also be implemented with a symmetric public signal structure by exchanging columns corresponding to types 1 and 2 of bidder 2 in the above table. Therefore, there is no gain in allowing asymmetric public signal structures. Since the optimal public signal structure is a special case of signal structures considered in the previous section, the ex ante payo¤ of a bidder now is obviously lower than the one found in Theorem 1. The structure of optimal public signals is similar to the one found in the previous Section. One of the high valuation types, call her a weak bidder, learns that the opponent has high valuation, while the other high valuation type, call her a strong bidder, is unsure about the valuation of the opponent. Furthermore, a weak bidder only bids against a strong bidder and vice versa. As was suggested in the Introduction, it is optimal to create as high asymmetry between both types as possible. As a result, both types bene…t. A strong bidder believes that the opponent has low valuation with high probability, and therefore does not bid aggressively, which in turn allows a weak bidder to bid less aggressively even so she knows that the opponent has high valuation.
For the signal structure in Theorem 1, the strong bidder, that is, type 1 is bidding zero in the equilibrium. It is sustained by the fact that the weak bidder, that is, type 2 is unsure about the signal that the opponent receives. However, with public signals such uncertainty is absent and, as a result, the strong bidder must now bid above zero with a positive probability. Therefore, the optimal public signal structure leads to lower payo¤s for the bidders compared to the one in Theorem 1. Nevertheless, this signal structure has an attractive feature that it does not depend on the initial prior. Therefore, if the center does not know p, he might prefer using the optimal public signal structure to facilitate collusion.
Independent Private Signal Structures
For the rest of the paper we assume that the signals are independently and identically distributed: x 1:i = x 2:i for all i 2 N , which we write as x i , and r ij = y i y j for all i; j 2 N . Of course,
That is, each signal i 2 N has ex ante positive probability to appear, otherwise we are back to the case with less signals. Without loss of generality we assume that
If this relationship is not satis…ed, we can always rename the signals. That is, we can always name the signal with the highest ratio as 1, and so on. 14 We prove later that if x i y i = x i+1 y i+1 for some i then signals i and i + 1 can be considered as one single signal with probabilities x i 0 = x i +x i+1 , y i 0 = y i +y i+1 and the corresponding symmetric equilibria are the same in terms of the payo¤s. Therefore, we will maintain these assumptions for the rest of the paper. We will now denote a signal structure by (x; y) n = (x j ; y j ) j2N .
The main result of this section is that once the signals are restricted to be independent, there is no …nite valued signal structure that would maximize the bidders'payo¤s, meaning that it is always possible to increase the payo¤s by allowing signals to take more values. First, however, we present the symmetric equilibrium strategies. In the equilibrium, the bidder with the lowest signal randomizes on an interval starting at V L and bidders with higher and higher signals randomize on higher and higher adjacent intervals.
Proposition 3 The unique symmetric equilibrium of the …rst price auction with independent private signal structure (x; y) n is as follows:
1. Bidder of type 1 bids 0 if y 1 = 0, otherwise she randomizes over b 0 ; b 1 according to the cumulative distribution function
2. Bidder of type i, for i = 2; :::; n, randomizes over b i 1 ; b i according to the cumulative distribution function
Remark 3 If for some i 2 N , x i y i = x i+1 y i+1 then i and i + 1 have the same expected payo¤ for any bid in [ b i 1 ; b i+1 ]. Moreover, it is easy to see that if we replace signals i and i + 1 with i 0 having probabilities x i 0 = x i + x i+1 , y i 0 = y i + y i+1 then in the corresponding equilibrium with n 1 signals it is true that b i 0 = b i+1 and the strategies of types di¤erent from i 0 do not change. This shows that our original assumption with strict inequalities is indeed without loss of generality.
The expected payo¤ of type i 2 N is
and each bidder's ex ante expected payo¤ is
Example 1 Let n = 2 and x 1 = y 2 = q and x 2 = y 1 = 1 q. That is, when signal 1 is equally indicative of value V L as signal 2 is of value V H . Then the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is the same as in Proposition 1 of Fang and Morris (2006) . They show that among these special signal structures there is an optimal q which minimizes the seller's revenue. However, this signal structure is not optimal for the bidders among all independent private signals. Indeed, the expected payo¤ of bidder when there are 2 signals is
The …rst order condition with respect to (w.r.t.) x 1 is
which is strictly positive if y 1 > 0. 15 Therefore, it is optimal to set x 1 = 1.
The …rst order condition w.r.t. y 1 is
which when set equal to 0 and imposing x 1 = 1 implies that
The second derivative w.r.t. y 1 is negative when evaluated at the optimal value of y 1 . This indicates that, if signals can take on 2 di¤erent values, x 1 = y 2 = q and x 2 = y 1 = 1 q does not hold under the optimal independent signal structure. Bidder's payo¤, given the optimal 2-valued independent signal structure, is
For example, when p = 0:25, bidder's ex ante payo¤ is 0:2813. For comparison, Fang and Morris (2006) show that q that minimizes the seller's revenue is 0:7639, which results in the bidder's payo¤ of 0:2628.
The following theorem shows what happens with the ex ante payo¤ as we increase the number of values that the signals can take.
Theorem 3 For any n-valued signal structure, (x; y) n there exists an (n + 1)valued signal structure, (x 0 ; y 0 ) n+1 such that the following is true:
To prove the theorem we take an arbitrary (x; y) n and we show that if x n > 0 then it cannot be optimal. Hence, we assume that x n = 0 and show that we can always introduce an additional signal value that strictly improves the bidder's payo¤.
Example 2 To illustrate the approach adopted in the proof of the theorem, consider the optimal 2-valued independent signal structure found in Example 1. We construct the 3-valued signal structure by reassigning the probabilities as follows:
x
Choosing = 0:5 and = 0:1, we …nd that bidder's ex ante payo¤ is 0:2841 when p = 0:25. Hence, the bidder's payo¤ is strictly higher than the one obtained under the optimal 2-valued independent signal structure. Further, the optimal 3-valued independent signal structure is 16
x 1 = 0:7295; y 1 = 0:1941;
x 2 = 0:2705; y 2 = 0:1941; x 3 = 0; y 3 = 0:6118;
which leads to the bidder's payo¤ of 0:2884.
To …nd the optimal independent signal structures for n > 2 and the corresponding payo¤s, we needed to resort to numerical computations. Figure 2 illustrates that although the bidder's payo¤ strictly increases in n, the gain is small when comparing the optimal payo¤s for n = 2 and n = 500. 17 (Note that n = 1 is equivalent to the case when there are no signals at all.) Further, the independent signal structures dominate the optimal public signal structure for low values of p, while the opposite result holds for high values of p. However, it can be veri…ed that on average (that is, assuming that the value of p is drawn from a uniform distribution) the optimal public signal structure outperforms the optimal 2-valued independent signal structure. Furthermore, as can be seen from Example 1, the optimal 2-valued independent signal structure depends on the knowledge of prior. Numerical results suggest that the same conclusions hold for n > 2. These arguments speak in favour of the use of optimal public signal structure to facilitate collusion. Finally, we can see that the optimal 2-valued correlated signal structure outperforms all other considered signal structures.
Collusion without an Omniscient Center
Our previous analysis hinges on the assumption that the bidders have access to a center, which possesses knowledge about their valuations. In the …rst example that follows, we show how the center can elicit this information from 20 the bidders in a weakly incentive compatible manner by naturally restricting the bids that the bidders can submit after reporting their valuation types to the center. In the second example, the bidders can extract information about each others' valuation from the …rst round of a sequential auction and bid collusively in the second round. In both examples we stress that the "role"of the omniscient center might be unwillingly played by a party, whose interests di¤er from those of the bidders.
Eliciting Bidders'Valuations
To justify the assumption that the center possesses knowledge about the bidders'valuations, here we provide a simple mechanism that allows the center to elicit bidders' private valuations. For that, it is enough to assume that no bidder is allowed to bid above the valuation that she has reported to the center. To be more precise, the mechanism is as follows. First, the bidders privately report their valuations to the center; then, conditional on the reported valuations, the center sends private signals to the bidders; …nally, the bidders bid weakly below their reported valuations in the …rst price auction.
We now argue that a bidder does not have incentives to misreport her valuation if the other bidder reports her valuation truthfully. From Lemma 1 it follows that a type 0 bidder always expects a payo¤ of zero and has no incentives to exaggerate her valuation. It is also easy to argue that in equilibrium, a high valuation type irrespective of the signal that she receives will never bid strictly below 0 (more generally, below V L ). Suppose a high valuation bidder reports to the center that her valuation is 0 and afterwards she bids 0. She can expect a strictly positive payo¤ only if there is a tie. We assume that the tie is broken according to the reported valuations and not the true ones. Note that this is consistent with the interpretation in Footnote 10 that ties are broken with the help of second price auction, and our assumption that no bidder can bid above her reported valuation. It follows that a high valuation bidder who has misreported her valuation can only win against the low valuation opponent. But she can achieve the same or even higher payo¤ by reporting her true valuation and then bidding 0. Hence, there is an equilibrium, in which both bidders reveal their valuations truthfully.
To justify the restriction on bids, we could think of a situation when a regulator, before …rms set their prices in a Bertrand duopoly, collects information about their marginal costs. Either during their dealings with the reg-ulator or through the regulator's annual reports about the industry, the …rms can obtain noisy information about rival's cost. Hence, here the regulator (unwillingly) plays the role of the center. Clearly, the …rms have incentives to exaggerate about their costs and then set low prices. In this case, collusion can not be maintained in equilibrium. Suppose, however, that the regulator does not allow a …rm to set price below its reported cost. Such a restriction can be reasonable as the regulator might have concerns about the quality of the service that the …rms provide etc.. Therefore, after learning that a …rm has set a lower price than its reported cost, the regulator can intervene for the protection of consumers. Though, as our analysis implies, by doing this, the regulator facilitates collusion between the …rms and harms consumers.
We conjecture that the result of this subsection also holds for more general setups besides the one with binary valuations.
A Sequential Auction
Suppose two identical items are sold in a sequential …rst price auction. There are only two bidders but each bidder demands both items. Furthermore, we assume that each bidder has the same valuation for both items, which can be either 0 or 1. The auction proceeds as follows. The bidders submit sealed bids for the …rst item, and the auctioneer only announces the winning bid. Next, bidders submit sealed bids for the second item, the winner of this item is determined and the payments are made. Now we present the equilibrium of this sequential auction. Let b 1 and b 2 denote the bids submitted by bidders 1 and 2 in the …rst round. A stylized distribution of types before the second round is:
A bidder of type (1; b i ) means that the bidder has high valuation and bidder i has won the …rst round auction with a bid of b i . f (b i ) denotes the probability that bidder i submits the bid b i in the …rst round. The seller's announcement of the winning bid works as a public signal, which allows the bidders to update their beliefs about the opponent's valuation. Thus, bidder i of type (1; b i ) now believes that the opponent has low valuation with probability p p+(1 p)F (b i ) , while bidder i of type (1; b j ), j 6 = i believes that the opponent has high valuation for sure. From Proposition 2 we know that both bidders of type 1;b , whereb = max fb 1 ; b 2 g, expect the same payo¤ from the second round, equal to p
irrespective of who submitted the winning bid in the …rst round. Expected payo¤ of bidder i with high valuation from both rounds is
which can be written as
At b i = 0, the expected payo¤ is 2p p ln p:
Thus, the …rst stage equilibrium strategy is implicitly de…ned by
We derive two conclusions from this example. First, the expected payo¤ of high valuation bidder, p (2 ln p) is higher than the one she would obtain if the seller did not disclose any information after the …rst round of auction. In the latter case, the expected payo¤ of high valuation bidder would be 2p. Thus, one can say that the seller is e¤ectively facilitating the collusion between the bidders. Second, if the bidders behaved myopically and updated their beliefs based only on the identity of the winner, but not on the winning bid, then the distribution of types before the second round would exactly correspond to the one derived from the optimal public signal structure in Theorem 2. 18 In this case, the expected payo¤ of bidder i with high valuation is
(
It follows that in the …rst round, the bidder would bid exactly as in a standard …rst price auction in the absence of any signals. The bidder's equilibrium payo¤ is equal to p + 2p 1+p , which is less than p (2 ln p) but still higher than 2p. Thus, even if the distribution of types before the second round is di¤erent from the one that would be obtained from the optimal public signal structure, the bidders bene…t from conditioning their second round beliefs on the winning bid of the …rst round, since it allows them already to suppress their bids in the …rst round.
Conclusions
We have considered the simplest IPV setup with only two bidders, whose valuations can either take low or high value. After bidders have learnt their own valuations but before submitting their bids in the …rst price auction, bidders receive private random signals from a center where the randomness depends on the bidders'realized valuation pro…le. Given the signals, bidders update their beliefs about their opponent's valuation, form beliefs about the signal received by the opponent and submit their bids. We have characterized the equilibrium bidding functions and compared bidders'equilibrium payo¤s across di¤erent signal structures, and we have found the following. When the signals can take on one of two possible values, we have calculated the optimal symmetric (correlated) signal structure. We have shown that the center must use the information about the valuations of bidders, or otherwise the bidders cannot collude at all. That is, there exists no collusive symmetric strategycorrelated equilibrium for 2-valued valuation-independent symmetric signal structures. If we restrict our attention to perfectly correlated signals (that is, public signals) the center can attain the optimal payo¤ with only 2-valued public signals. If two signals are chosen independently and identically, the more values the signal can take on the better payo¤s bidders can achieve in the symmetric equilibrium. Numerical results suggest that the optimum achieved with 2-valued correlated signals is the overall optimum among the signal structures that have been studied. However, the optimal signal structure depends on the bidders' prior beliefs. It is shown that the optimum achieved with public signals is instead independent of the prior. Hence, a center which does not know the bidders'prior might prefer to use public signals to enhance bidders'collusion. We have also provided an example how a public signal structure emerges endogenously without the help of center after the …rst round of a sequential auction, hence resulting in collusive bidding in the second round of that auction.
Case 1 If Pr (1j1) Pr (1j2) > 0 and Pr (0j1) Pr (0j2) Pr (1j1) Pr (1j2) ; then 1. type 1 randomizes on 0; b 1 according to
2. type 2 randomizes on b 1 ; b 2 according to
where b 2 = 1 (Pr (0j2) + Pr (1j2)) 1 b 1 :
Case 2 2. type 2 randomizes on 0; b 1 according to
Pr (1j2) Pr (2j2) where b 2 = 1 Pr (0j2). Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, let Pr (0j1) Pr (0j2). We also assume that Pr (2j1) > 0, Pr (1j2) > 0 and Pr (kj1) 6 = Pr (kj2) for some k 2 f0; 1; 2g hold. As discussed in the main text, if these assumptions are not satis…ed, the expected payo¤ of bidder is p (1 p).
It is easy to argue that the supremum of all submitted bids does not exceed 1 in any equilibrium. Also, by bidding 1, a type i bidder, i = 1; 2, expects a payo¤ of 0. To sustain it as a part of equilibrium, she must assign zero probability to the opponent bidding anything less than 1. However, given that x 1 + x 2 = 1 and r 12 > 0 holds, there is a type of opponent who will bid for sure strictly less than 1. 19 It follows that the supremum of all submitted bids is strictly less than 1, and each type i bidder, i = 1; 2, expects a strictly positive payo¤ and wins with a strictly positive probability in any equilibrium.
Suppose now that bidder 2 of a high valuation type bids 0 <b < 1 with a strictly positive probability in an equilibrium. Then bidder 1 of either high valuation type, instead of bidding in the interval hb ;b
i for some > 0, is better o¤ by biddingb + where > 0 is su¢ ciently small. But then bidder 2 is better o¤ to bidb instead ofb, which contradicts our assumption that she bids 0 <b < 1 with a strictly positive probability. Thus, only the bid of 0 can possibly occur with a strictly positive probability. Further, the high valuation bidders cannot tie with a positive probability at 0 in the equilibrium, as either bidder will instead prefer to bid just above 0. In particular, it implies that if type i bids 0 with a positive probability then r ii = 0.
Let F i (b) be the distribution function according to which type i, i = 1; 2, randomizes in an equilibrium. Consider the union of supports of F 1 (b) and F 2 (b). We claim that this union of supports is a connected set. Suppose to the contrary that bidder 2 with high valuation bidsb but does not bid in the interval hb ;b . But then bidder 1 with high valuation prefers bidding b instead ofb. In the same way we can argue that the lower limit of the union of supports is 0.
Since there are no ties between high valuation bidders in equilibrium, the expected payo¤ of type i bidder from submitting a bid b is given by
Let i denote the expected payo¤ of type i, i = 1; 2. Equation (12) implies that i Pr (0ji). We have already argued that there is a type i such that b i = 0. Therefore, either 1 = Pr (0j1) or 2 = Pr (0j2) or both must hold. If i = Pr (0ji) for i = 1; 2, then the ex ante payo¤s are the same as in the absence of collusive communication. If b 1 = b 2 , then 1 = 2 = max fPr (0j1) ; Pr (0j2)g = Pr (0j1). If b i > b j , then j i = 1 b i . Now we derive what are the restrictions on the conditional probabilities for one or another equilibrium con…guration to exist, and next, using the identi…ed restrictions, we determine what is the equilibrium con…guration for each signal structure.
Suppose there is an equilibrium in which 0 = b i < b j holds. Then Pr (iji) > 0, and the expected payo¤ of type i from bidding on the interval 0; b j is
for 0 b b j . Consider now type j, who deviates and bids below b j . The expected payo¤ is
It must be that the term in curly brackets is positive or otherwise type j will …nd it pro…table to deviate. Hence,
must hold. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which b i > b j holds. Then Pr (iji) > 0, and the expected payo¤ of type i from bidding on the interval b j ; b i is
for b 2 b j ; b i . Consider now type j, who deviates and bids above b j . The expected payo¤ is
must hold.
that is, there exists an interval, in which both types bid in an equilibrium. For the bids in this interval we can set the expression in (12) equal to i and multiply both sides with Pr (jjj). Similarly, we multiply the analogous expression for type j with Pr (jji):
Subtracting the second line from the …rst and re-arranging, we obtain the expression for F i (b) in the region where the supports intersect: (17) The conditional probabilities and payo¤s must be such that F i (b) is a strictly increasing function in this region. Also note that if Pr (2j2) Pr (1j1) = Pr (2j1) Pr (1j2), then the supports of both types cannot overlap.
We are now in the position to determine the equilibria for all possible values of conditional probabilities. To simplify the analysis, we initially …nd a symmetric equilibrium, in which the support of bids for each type is connected. Afterwards, we will argue that it is the unique symmetric equilibrium by showing that there are no symmetric equilibria, in which the support for either type is disconnected. 
imply that 0 < Pr (2j1) < Pr (2j2) and
also hold. According to (14), conditions (18) and (19), in turn, imply that 0 = b 1 b 2 must hold. We argue by contradiction that b 2 < b 1 cannot happen in the equilibrium. If 1 Pr (0j1) and 2 = Pr (0j2), then F 2 (b) is a non-increasing function in (17) for (i; j) = (2; 1). Therefore, if b 2 < b 1 , then 1 = Pr (0j1) and 2 > Pr (0j2), which also implies that F 2 (b 2 ) = 0. However, evaluating (17) for (i; j) = (2; 1) at b 2 , we …nd that 1 b 2 = Pr (1j1) 2 Pr (1j2) Pr (0j1) Pr (1j1) Pr (0j2) Pr (1j2) Pr (0j1) > 1;
or b 2 < 0. Thus, it follows that b 1 = b 2 must hold, that is, the types bid on adjacent intervals. Thus, type 1 bids on 0; b 1 according to (13) or (8), where b 1 is de…ned by F 1 b 1 = 1 and is given in (9). Type 2 bids on b 1 ; b 2 according to (15). Since type 2 must be indi¤erent between bidding b 1 and b 2 , it follows that b 2 is given by (11). This allows to rewrite (15) into the form given in (10).
Case 2. Pr (1j1) > Pr (1j2) > 0 and
Pr (0j2)
also hold. According to (14), conditions (20) and (21) imply that it must be the case that b 1 = b 2 = 0. If 0 = b i < b j , then type j would have incentives to bid below b j . Pr (1j1) > 0 and Pr (2j2) > 0 imply that there cannot be a mass point at 0, and the payo¤s are 1 = Pr (0j1) and 2 = Pr (0j2), which results in the same ex ante payo¤s as in the case without collusive communication. Further, given the assumed conditions on probabilities, we can verify that the distribution function in (17) is well-de…ned for i = 1; 2, that is, it is positively sloped. Also, according to (17) Since the former value of b is smaller than the latter, it means that F 1 (b) reaches 1 earlier. Therefore, b 1 = Pr (2j2) Pr (1j1) Pr (2j1) Pr (1j2) Pr (2j2) Pr (2j1) > 0 and b 2 = 1 2 = 1 Pr (0j2) b 1 . Further, one can verify that distribution functions (15) and (17) for (i; j) = (2; 1) evaluated at b 1 , give the same answer: To summarize, in the equilibrium, the types 1 and 2 bid according to (17), where 1 = Pr (0j1) and 2 = Pr (0j2), on the interval 0; b 1 , and type 2 also bids on b 1 ; b 2 according to (15).
Case 3. According to (16), conditions Pr (1j1) < Pr (1j2) and Pr (2j1) Pr (2j2) imply that b 1 b 2 holds. But then 2 = 1 b 2 , and it must be the case that 1 2 or otherwise type 1 would deviate and bid b 2 . We argue that b 2 < b 1 cannot happen in the equilibrium. Conditions Pr (1j1) < Pr (1j2) and Pr (2j1) Pr (2j2) together with 1 2 imply that F i (b) in (17) is a decreasing function for one of the types, depending on the sign of Pr (2j2) Pr (1j1) Pr (2j1) Pr (1j2). Therefore, b 1 = b 2 must hold, and the types bid as in Case 1.
Case 4. According to (16), conditions Pr (1j1) < Pr (1j2) and Pr (2j1) > Pr (2j2) imply that there cannot be an equilibrium in which b i > b j , as type j will want to deviate and bid above b j . Hence, if there is an equilibrium, b 1 = b 2 must hold. This in turn implies that 1 = 2 . As we know that i Pr (0ji) for i = 1; 2 and there exists a type j for whom j = Pr (0jj), it must be the case that 1 = 2 = Pr (0j1). This in turn implies that F 2 (b 2 ) = 0, and 0 = b 1 b 2 . Also, since i = 1 b i for i = 1; 2, then b 1 = b 2 = 1 Pr (0j1).
Since F 2 (b 2 ) = 0, from (17) for (i; j) = (2; 1), we can solve out for b 2 :
b 2 = Pr (1j1) (Pr (0j1) Pr (0j2)) Pr (1j2) Pr (0j1) Pr (1j1) Pr (0j2) 0:
Further, from (17) for (i; j) = (1; 2), we …nd that
Also note that (13) for i = 1 gives the same expression for F 1 (b 2 ). We can also verify that F 1 (b 2 ) < 1. It holds if Pr (0j1)+Pr (1j1) < Pr (0j2)+Pr (1j2), which is indeed true as it is equivalent to Pr (2j1) > Pr (2j2). Finally, one can also verify that b 2 < b 1 = b 2 . Hence, we have characterized the equilibrium, in which type 1 bids according to (13) Finally, we prove that in any symmetric equilibrium, the support of equilibrium bids for each type must be connected. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an interval b; b such that only type i bids in this interval, while type j (and possibly type i) bids on two disconnected intervals, and b is the upper limit of the …rst of these intervals, while b is the lower limit of the second of these intervals. Note that F j (b) = F j b and Pr (iji) > 0 hold. The expected payo¤ of type i from bidding in the interval b; b is
Consider now type j, who deviates and bids in b; b . The expected payo¤ is
The above expression is linear in b. Further, note that in equilibrium, type j is indi¤erent between bidding b and b. Therefore, he must be indi¤erent among all bids in the interval b; b , which implies that the expression in the curly brackets is zero. Then, 20
and j = Pr (ijj) Pr (iji) i :
It immediately follows from (23) that there is at most one discontinuity in the support for each type.
We again consider all four cases.
Case 1. According to Pr (1j1) Pr (1j2), Pr (2j1) < Pr (2j2), and (19), it is true that F 1 (b) < 0 for (i; j) = (2; 1) in (23). Therefore, the support of bids for type 1 is connected. Further, from the previous analysis of Case 1, we already know that b 1 = 0. It means that type i = 1 must bid not only in the interval b; b , but also in [0; b]. But then there is an interval, in which both types bid, which has already been ruled out by the previous analysis. Hence, it must be that the support of bids for type j = 2 is also connected.
Case 2. According to Pr (1j1) > Pr (1j2), Pr (2j1) < Pr (2j2), (20), and (21), we obtain that F 1 (b) < 0 and F 2 (b) < 0 in (23), which is a contradiction. Therefore, the support of bids for each type must be connected.
Case 3. We already know that the supports of both types cannot overlap and b 1 < b 2 holds. Therefore, if the support of bids for type 1 is disconnected, then so is the support of bids for type 2. Thus, it is su¢ cient to argue that the support of bids for type 2 must be connected. We already know that 1 2 . However, equation (24) for (i; j) = (1; 2) together with Pr (1j1) < Pr (1j2), implies that 1 < 2 . Hence, we have obtained a contradiction.
Case 4. We know that in any equilibrium b 1 = b 2 and 1 = 2 must hold. Then, (24) implies that Pr (ijj) = Pr (iji), which contradicts the assumptions about conditional probabilities that Pr (1j1) < Pr (1j2) and
Pr (2j1) > Pr (2j2).
This completes the proof that the support of bids must always be connected for each type in a symmetric equilibrium. This also implies that the equilibrium that we have found before is the unique symmetric equilibrium for each distribution of signals. Proof of Theorem 1. We structure the proof along the cases identi…ed in Proposition 1.
Case 1 and 3. These cases result in the same equilibrium structure whereby the types bid on adjacent intervals. Combining them, the restrictions on probabilities such that the types bid on adjacent intervals are Pr (0j1) Pr (0j2) ; Pr (2j2) Pr (2j1) ; Pr (0j1) Pr (1j1) Pr (0j2) Pr (1j2) ; or equivalently, px 1 px 1 + (1 p) (r 11 + r 12 ) px 2 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) ;
(1 p) r 22 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) (1 p) r 12 px 1 + (1 p) (r 11 + r 12 ) ;
x 1 r 11
x 2 r 12 :
The payo¤ of high valuation bidder before she receives a signal is Pr (1) 1 + Pr (2) 2 = Pr (1) Pr (0j1) + Pr (2) 1 b 2 = Pr (1) Pr (0j1) + Pr (2) (Pr (0j2) + Pr (1j2)) Pr (0j1) Pr (0j1) + Pr (1j1) = px 1 1 + px 2 + (1 p) r 12 px 1 + (1 p) r 11 = px 1 p + (1 p) (r 11 + r 12 ) px 1 + (1 p) r 11 ;
where we have used (9) and (11), and Pr (i) for i = 1; 2 denotes the probability that the bidder will be of type i.
Hence, the problem that we are solving is 21 max x 1 ;x 2 ;r 11 ;r 12 ;r 22
subject to
x 1 + x 2 = 1; r 11 + 2r 12 + r 22 = 1;
x 2 r 12 ; px 1 px 1 + (1 p) (r 11 + r 12 ) px 2 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) ;
and all probabilities (x 1 ; x 2 ; r 11 ; r 12 ; r 22 ) must be non-negative. The nonnegativity constraints together with the above equality constraints ensure that each of the probabilities is also less than 1. The inspection of this program tells that the objective function is increasing in x 1 . Therefore, setting x 1 = 1 and x 2 = 0 is optimal, since it does not violate any of the constraints. Using these results, we simplify our problem to max r 11 ;r 12 ;r 22 r 12 p + (1 p) r 11 subject to r 11 + 2r 12 + r 22 = 1; r 22 (p + (1 p) r 11 ) (1 p) r 2 12 ;
and (r 11 ; r 12 ; r 22 ) must be non-negative. Note that we have taken a monotone transformation of the objective function. Suppose the above inequality does not bind. Then it is always possible to increase the payo¤ by raising r 12 by a small amount, and correspondingly decreasing r 22 . (If r 22 = 0, then r 12 = 0 must also hold. But then the objective also takes zero value, which is clearly not a maximum.) Therefore, r 22 (p + (1 p) r 11 ) = (1 p) r 2 12 holds. Using both equalities we can solve for r 11 and r 12 as functions of r 22
and write the objective function as which is always increasing in r 22 .
To now, we have ignored the non-negativity constraints that r 11 0 and r 12 > 0 must also be satis…ed. One can verify from (27) that r 12 > 0 is satis…ed for all 0 < r 22 1, while from (26), r 11 is always decreasing in r 22 . Therefore, r 22 can be raised up to the point where r 11 = 0, implying that r 12 = p p 1 + p p ;
Evaluating (25) at the optimum gives that the payo¤ of high valuation bidder before she receives a signal is p p. Therefore, bidder's ex ante payo¤ is (1 p) p p in the optimum.
Case 2. The payo¤s of types 1 and 2 are, respectively, 1 = Pr (0j1) and
px 1 px 1 + (1 p) (r 11 + r 12 ) px 2 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) ;
(1 p) r 12 px 1 + (1 p) (r 11 + r 12 ) > (1 p) r 22 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) ; and all probabilities (x 1 ; x 2 ; r 11 ; r 12 ; r 22 ) must be non-negative. The objective is increasing in x 1 and decreasing in r 11 and r 12 . Consider decreasing r 11 by 2 , while increasing r 12 by . Then, none of the constraints is violated and the objective has increased. Therefore, it is optimal to set r 11 = 0. We can re-write the inequality constraints as
We want px 1 px 1 + (1 p) r 12 to be as high as possible but strictly less than the right-most expression in the above constraint. It follows that this program does not have a maximum. If we sat the second inequality as equality in the above constraint, we would obtain that Pr (0j1) = 1 Pr (2j2). This, together with Pr (1j1) = 0, implies that F 1 (b 2 ) = 1 in (22), that is, the types bid on adjacent intervals, which contradicts the equilibrium structure of Case 4.
Although program (P2) does not have a maximum, we still need to verify that its supremum does not exceed the maximum that we have found for program (P1). To …nd the supremum, we can rewrite (P2) in the following form: max
x 1 + x 2 = 1; 2r 12 + r 22 = 1; px 1 px 1 + (1 p) r 12 px 2 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) ; px 1 px 1 + (1 p) r 12 = px 2 + (1 p) r 12 px 2 + (1 p) (r 12 + r 22 ) ; and all probabilities (x 1 ; x 2 ; r 12 ; r 22 ) must be non-negative, where the objective of (P3) is obtained by combining the three equality constraints to express x 1 as a function of r 12 . At the same time, we know that the solution to program (P1) satis…es r 11 = 0 and the third inequality holds as equality.
If we impose these constraints on (P1) from the outset, we obtain program (P3). (The …rst inequality in (P1) is automatically satis…ed when r 11 = 0 and therefore can be ignored.) Hence, we conclude that (P1) and (P3) have the same solution. This completes the proof that the optimal signal structure is given as the solution to program (P1). Proof of Proposition 2. Given a public signal i 2 N , if r ii = 0, then the bidder with a high valuation knows that the opponent has a low valuation and therefore both will bid 0. If x 1:i = x 2:i = 0 and r ii > 0, then it is common knowledge that the valuations of both bidders are equal to 1. It is a standard argument to show that the unique equilibrium involves both bidders submitting bids equal to 1.
Suppose that x l:i x m:i , x l:i > 0,and r ii > 0. First, note that F l:i b i = F m:i b i = 1 is satis…ed and so the distribution functions (1) and (2) are well de…ned. The expected payo¤ of bidder l with valuation v l = 1 is given by
Substituting (2) into (28), we can verify that bidder l is indi¤erent among all bids in the interval 0; b i , earning the expected payo¤ given in (3). Similarly, the expected payo¤ of bidder m with valuation v m = 1 is
Substituting (1) into (29), we can verify that bidder m is also indi¤erent among all bids in the interval 0; b i , earning the same expected payo¤ given in (3). Obviously, no bidder has incentives to bid above b i , while any bid below 0 would give a payo¤ of 0. Thus, we can conclude that (1) and (2) represent the equilibrium strategies of high valuation bidders when they observe the public signal i.
To prove that this equilibrium is unique, we can argue as in the proof of Proposition 1 that each bidder of type i will submit a bid according to an atomless distribution function, except possibly at 0; ties occur with zero probability; the supports of both distribution functions coincide; the common support is connected with the lower limit being equal to 0. Then the payo¤ of bidders 1 and 2 are given by (28) and (29), respectively. The common support also implies that the equilibrium payo¤s of both bidders are the same and equal to the expression in (3). Equating (28) and (29) with (3) gives (1) and (2). Hence, the equilibrium is unique. Proof of Theorem 2.
We partition all signals into two sets, S and N nS. The former contains all signals i such that x 1:i > x 2:i , while the latter contains all signals such that x 1:i < x 2:i . Signals i for whom x 1:i = x 2:i holds are assigned arbitrarily as long as each set is non-empty.
Using the results of Proposition 2, the joint ex ante payo¤ of bidders is p (1 p) times the following expression
x 1:i px 2:i + (1 p) r ii px 1:i + (1 p) r ii :
The …rst two terms represent the payo¤ of bidder 1, and the other two terms -the payo¤ of bidder 2. Using X i2S
x 1:i + X i2N nS
x 1:i = 1;
X i2S
x 2:i + X i2N nS
x 2:i = 1;
we can rewrite the joint payo¤ as 2 X i2N nS
(30) The expression in (30) is increasing in x 1:i for all i 2 S but decreasing for all i 2 N nS. Similarly, (30) is increasing in x 2:i for all i 2 N nS but decreasing for all i 2 S. Therefore, x 1:i = 0 for all i 2 N nS and x 2:i = 0 for all i 2 S, and we simplify (30) to 2 + X i2N nS
x 1:i (1 p) r ii px 1:i + (1 p) r ii :
One can verify that
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(This inequality can be rewritten as (ad bc) 2 0.) Therefore,
where we have additionally used the fact that P i2N nS x 2:i = P i2S x 1:i = 1. Therefore, we can increase the joint payo¤ if we aggregate all signals i 2 S into a (new) signal 1 and all signals i 2 N nS into a (new) signal 2 such that x 1:1 = 1,x 1:2 = 0,x 2:1 = 0,x 2:2 = 1,r 11 = P i2S r ii , andr 22 = P i2N nS r ii = 1 r 11 . Given these signals 1 and 2, we can apply Proposition 2 to verify that the joint equilibrium payo¤ is indeed given by
This completes the proof that it is su¢ cient that the public signal takes one of two values in order to achieve the maximal joint payo¤.
To …nd the optimal distribution of signals, it remains to maximize (31) subject tor 11 +r 22 = 1. It follows thatr 11 =r 22 = 0:5. According to (3), a high valuation bidder expects a payo¤ of 2p 1+p irrespective of the public signal that she observes. The ex ante payo¤ of bidder is p (1 p) 2 1+p . Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that F i b i = 1 for all i 2 N is satis…ed and so the mixed strategies are well de…ned. Suppose that bidder 2 follows the strategy given in Proposition 3 and y 1 > 0. Consider bidder 1 of type i 2 N . Her expected payo¤ when bidding
Substituting F i (b) from (4) yields a positive constant
Therefore, bidder 1 is indeed indi¤erent between any bid in the interval b i 1 ; b i .
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Suppose now that bidder 1 of type i bids in an interval b j 1 ; b j for j 6 = i. Her expected payo¤ is
where the rest of the terms that do not contain b are collected in the parameter . Since x j =y j > x i =y i for all j < i, it follows that the payo¤ of type i is increasing in b for b < b i 1 and therefore bidder 1 of type i does not want to deviate by bidding below b i 1 . Similarly, since x j =y j < x i =y i for all j > i, it follows that the payo¤ of type i is decreasing in b for b > b i and therefore bidder 1 of type i does not want to deviate by bidding above b i either. The same argument establishes that there is no equilibrium, in which the supports of equilibrium strategies are arranged in a di¤erent order. That is, for any two types i and j such that i < j it must be the case that the support of type i's mixed strategy must lie to the left of the support of type j's mixed strategy. It remains to prove that supports cannot overlap in an equilibrium. Suppose on the contrary that an interval b; b belongs to the support of equilibrium mixed strategies of more than one type. Let the set of these types be denoted by S. The expected payo¤ of type i 2 S from bidding in the interval b; b is
whereF k (b) denotes the distribution of bids for type k in this equilibrium. If we multiply both sides with y j px j + (1 p) y j where j 2 Sn fig, we obtain
If we subtract the analogous expression, in which the roles of types i and j are reversed, from the above expression we have that
Given that x i y j 6 = x j y i , the above expression is satis…ed only for a single value of b. Therefore, the supports of mixed strategies of types i and j cannot overlap in the equilibrium. This completes the proof that the symmetric equilibrium, described in Proposition 3, is unique. If y 1 = 0, using the tie breaking rule, the proof is basically the same. Proof of Theorem 3. Using (5)- (7), the expected payo¤ of a bidder can be expressed as P (x; y) = (1 p) (z 1 + z 1 z 2 + z 1 z 2 z 3 + ::: + z 1 z 2 :::z n 1 z n ) ;
where z i = px i + (1 p) y i P i 1 j=1 y j px i 1 + (1 p) y i 1 P i 1 j=1 y j for i > 1 and z 1 = px 1 . The proof consists of two parts. First, we show that a signal structure (x; y) n with x n > 0 cannot be optimal. Next, we show for any signal structure (x; y) n with x n = 0 how we can increase bidder's payo¤ by introducing an additional signal.
Assume …rst that x n > 0. Let us de…ne a new signal structure (x 0 ; y 0 ) n as follows: x 0 i = x i for i = 1; :::; n 2, x 0 n 1 = x n 1 + , x 0 n = x n 0, and y 0 i = y i for i = 1; :::; n. must be su¢ ciently small to ensure that x 0 n 2 =y 0 n 2 > x 0 n 1 =y 0 n 1 holds. 22 Given the assumptions about (x 0 ; y 0 ) n+1 , we only need to show that z n 1 (1 + z n ) < z 0 n 1 (1 + z 0 n ) 22 It can also be shown that it is always possible to increase bidder's payo¤ by introducing an extra signal when x n > 0. It can be done by de…ning the new probabilities in the following way: x 0 i = x i and y 0 i = y i for i = 1; :::; n 1, and x 0 n = x n =2+ , x 0 n+1 = x n =2 0, y 0 n = y n =2, and y 0 n+1 = y n =2, where is such that x 0 n 1 =y 0 n 1 > x 0 n =y 0 n holds. 44 or px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 P y j px n 2 + (1 p) y n 2 P y j 1 + px n + (1 p) y n ( P y j + y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) < p (x n 1 + ) + (1 p) y n 1 P y j px n 2 + (1 p) y n 2 P y j 1 + p (x n ) + (1 p) y n ( P y j + y n 1 ) p (x n 1 + ) + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 )
where we write P y j instead of P n 2 j=1 y j . The above expression is equivalent to px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 P y j px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) < p (x n 1 + ) + (1 p) y n 1 P y j p (x n 1 + ) + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) :
The right hand side is increasing in and since both sides are equivalent for = 0, it follows that we can always increase the payo¤ by shifting some probability away from x n to x n 1 . Thus, x n > 0 cannot hold in the optimum. Suppose now that x n = 0. We introduce an additional signal in the following way: x 0 i = x i and y 0 i = y i for i = 1; :::; n 2, x 0 n 1 + x 0 n = x n 1 and y 0 n 1 + y 0 n + y 0 n+1 = y n 1 + y n , and let x 0 n+1 = 0. Now we need to compare z n 1 (1 + z n ) with z 0 n 1 1 + z 0 n 1 + z 0 n+1 . Now z n 1 (1 + z n ) = px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 P y j px n 2 + (1 p) y n 2 P y j 1 + (1 p) y n ( P y j + y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 )
where we write P y j instead of P n 2 j=1 y j , while 
px n 1 + (1 p) (y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) 1 < px 0 Let us de…ne the new probabilities as follows:
x 0 n 1 = (1 ) x n 1 ; x 0 n = x n 1 ; x 0 n+1 = 0; y 0 n 1 = (1 ) y n 1 ; y 0 n = y n 1 + ; y 0 n+1 = y n ;
where 2 (0; 1) and 2 (0; y n ).
Using that x n 1 y n 1 = x 0 n 1 y 0 n 1 ; the left hand side of (32) becomes px n 1 + (1 p) (y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) px 0 n 1 + (1 p) y 0 n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) 1:
Further, using that x n 1 = x 0 n 1 + x 0 n and y n 1 + y n = y 0 n 1 + y 0 n + y 0 n+1 , it can be written as px 0 n + (1 p) y 0 n + y 0 n+1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) px 0 n 1 + (1 p) y 0 n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) :
Thus, it remains to check whether the following inequality px 0 n + (1 p) y 0 n + y 0 n+1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) px 0 n 1 + (1 p) y 0 n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) < px 0 n + (1 p) y 0 n P y j + y 0 n 1 px 0 n 1 + (1 p) y 0 n 1 P y j + y 0 n 1 px 0 n + (1 p) y 0 n + y 0 n+1 P y j + y 0 n 1 + y 0 n px 0 n + (1 p) y 0 n P y j + y 0 n 1 + y 0 n or, after substituting for x 0 n 1 , x 0 n , y 0 n 1 , and y 0 n , and re-arranging, whether the following inequality px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + ) ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + ) ( P y j + y n 1 + ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 + ) > 0 is true. We take the …rst order Taylor expansion of the above expression at = 0 to see if for > 0 this expression is strictly positive. If the above expression is represented as f ( ), then f ( ) = f (0) + f 0 (0) + R ( ). Notice that if = 0, then the above expression is equal to 0, that is, f (0) = 0, while f 0 (0) 47 is px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) (1 p) ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) (1 p) ( P y j + (1 + ) y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) + p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) ;
which can be simpli…ed to 1 (1 p) ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) 1
(1 p) ( P y j + (1 + ) y n 1 ) px n 1 + (1 p) y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) p x n 1 + (1 p) ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) :
To simplify notation, let = p 1 p x n 1 . Then 1 P y j + (1 ) y n 1 + y n 1 ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 ) 1 P y j + (1 + ) y n 1 + y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 ) + y n 1 + y n + ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 ) = ( + ( y n 1 + y n ) ( P y j + y n 1 )) y n y n 1 ( + y n 1 ) ( + y n 1 ( P y j + (1 ) y n 1 )) ( + y n 1 ( P y j + y n 1 )) :
It follows that if is chosen such that 0 < < min 1; y n y n 1 ( + y n 1 ) ;
then the derivative f 0 (0) is positive, which was necessary to prove. Finally,
R ( ) = f 00 ( ) 2 2 where 2 [0; ]. f 00 ( ) exists and is …nite for 2 [0; ]. Therefore, for a given , satisfying (33), we can always select satisfying f 0 (0) + f 00 ( ) 2 > 0.
